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We (Still) Need to Talk About Aereo: New Controversies and Unresolved Questions
After the Supreme Court’s Decision*
Rebecca Giblin** & Jane C. Ginsburg***

Forthcoming, Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts
Prepublication copy
Introduction
Recent judicial interpretations of U.S. copyright law have prompted businesses to design
technologies in ways that enable the making and transmission of copies of works to
consumers while falling outside the scope of the owner’s exclusive rights. The archetypal
example was Aereo, Inc.’s system for providing online access to broadcast television. Aereo
allowed users to tune into individual antennae to stream near-live TV to themselves, online.
If this activity fell within the scope of the exclusive right of public performance, then it
required the permission of right holders.1 The “transmit clause” of the U.S. Copyright Act’s
definition of “to perform publicly” brings within the scope of the public performance right:
[T]ransmitting or otherwise communicating a performance or display of the
work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members
of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.2
Holdings from the Second Circuit that the relevant performance was the specific
transmission from each copy, and that those performances could not be public if made to
Some parts of this paper have been developed or drawn from the authors’ previous work on the topic.
See Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We Need to Talk About Aereo: Copyright-Avoiding Business
Models, Cloud Storage and a Principled Reading of the “Transmit” Clause (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr.
for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 480, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/TA7Y-T7CG; Jane C.
Ginsburg, Letter from the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain Compliance with
International Norms, 241 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR (forthcoming July 2014).
Many thanks for research assistance to Taylor Jones, J.D., 2014, Columbia Law School, and to Nell
Ethridge, J.D., 2015, Columbia Law School.
**
Senior Lecturer, Monash University (Melbourne, Australia). Thanks to Monash University’s
Research Accelerator Grant, which partly supported the development of this work over 2013–14.
***
Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia Law School. This
Article benefited from the support of the Philippe P. Dauman Faculty Research Fund.
1
The process also implicated the exclusive right of reproduction, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012), since
copies of broadcasts are made when users instruct Aereo’s system that they wish to “watch” or
“record” a show. However, Aereo argued that the copies are made by consumers and amount to
unremunerable fair uses in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 holding that consumer
uses of Sony’s Betamax VCR to timeshift free broadcast television programming are lawful. See
Brief for Respondent at 36–37, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498
(2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1245459 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984)). Those copies were not the subject of the current litigation and so the merits of
that argument will not be discussed further in this Article.
2
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
*
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only a single user, gave Aereo a blueprint for avoiding liability. 3 It took up the invitation
by designing a system incorporating thousands of dime-sized antennas.4 By temporarily
assigning one to each user, from which she could access only the signals she could freely
pick up from her own rooftop, Aereo’s service enabled individual copies to be made of
each program and then transmitted on request to the user.5 Since each transmission was
directed only to the single requesting user, Aereo argued it could not be “to the public.”6
Broadcasters sought a preliminary injunction against Aereo on the grounds that its near-live
transmissions were indeed infringing public performances. 7 The broadcasters principally
contended that under the statute, the relevant performance was not the unique transmission,
but the performance of the underlying work.8 The Southern District of New York and the
Second Circuit adopted Aereo’s interpretation; the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed, six to three.9
At their broadest, the implications of both parties’ contentions were equally unpalatable.
Aereo’s interpretation focused attention on the audience of a particular transmission of a
performance of the work. This approach, if given the imprimatur of the Supreme Court,
would have encouraged others to design similar technologies to involve unique copies and
transmissions, in order to immunize themselves from any finding of infringement of the
public performance right.10 Moreover, by effectively reading the coverage of asynchronous
transmissions out of the statute, Aereo’s construction might also have placed the United
States in violation of its international obligation to implement the exclusive right to make
works available “in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and
at a time individually chosen by them.”11
The broadcasters’ focused on the communication of the performance of the underlying
work,12 taken to its own extreme, had the potential to impose public performance liability on
any provider, including cloud storage providers such as Dropbox, whose technology
happened to involve transmissions of the same work to multiple members of the public, and

3

See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 124–25 (2d Cir.
2008); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d
607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also discussion infra Part I.B.1.a.
4
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
5
See id.
6
Id. at 2508.
7
Id. at 2503–04.
8
See id. at 2504.
9
Id. at 2503–04.
10
Not all technology providers would be able to “Aereoize” themselves: several factors would need to
be present to make it possible to do so. Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note *, at 20.
11
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 105-17 (1997), 2186 U.N.T.S. 121.
12
See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2508.
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regardless of whether or not the service had initially proposed to transmit the work to the
consumer.13
A majority of the Supreme Court held that Aereo’s near-live transmissions were indeed
performances that Aereo made to the public, and Aereo has now been enjoined from
engaging in any transmissions while broadcasts are airing. 14 However, the Court crafted
those holdings narrowly in an explicit attempt to limit their implications for other technology
providers.15 In so doing, it resolved the controversy over which is the statutorily relevant
performance, but raised a number of puzzling new questions. After setting out the factual
context and outlining the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision, we consider the
ramifications of the decision for other technology providers and users, and debate the merits
and weaknesses of the decision.

I. The Controversy
A. Aereo’s Design
Aereo launched its online television service in 2012. Tapping into perceived consumer
frustration with high cable prices and inflexible “bundling” models,16 it enabled individuals
to access recorded broadcast content over the Internet from computers and mobile devices, in
a way that obviated consumers’ need for any physical recording device—or even a TV set.17
Subscribers could use Aereo’s technology to watch broadcast television either near-live or at
their later convenience from a variety of Internet-connected screens, including phones and
tablets.18 By adding geographic and temporal flexibility while still preserving the ability to
watch TV live, Aereo provided what for many users was a better-than-perfect substitute for
live TV viewership.19

This is an illustration of the broadest interpretation of the broadcasters’ argument. There were
potential ways of reading the clause more narrowly to avoid the worst of the threatened collateral
damage. Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note *, at 25.
14
See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo IV), Nos. 12-cv-1540 & 12-cv-1543, 2014 WL
5393867 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014). Aereo has since filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. See
The Next Chapter, AEREO (Nov. 21, 2014), http://perma.cc/GUF6-YJVL.
15
See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2510–11; see also text quoted infra note 142.
16
Jeff John Roberts, Aereo’s Big Bet to Break the TV Industry: CEO Chet Kanojia Explains, GIGAOM
(Feb. 7, 2013), http://perma.cc/E3B3-N3EC?type=source.
17
See Press Release, Aereo, Aereo Announces $20.5M Series A Financing Led by IAC; New
Technology Platform Allows Consumers Access to Live TV over the Internet (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://perma.cc/H3M4-JPYJ.
18
See id.
19
Aereo emphasized this in a press release, announcing: “Now you have the gift of portability. And
when it comes to sports, the only thing better than portability is LIVE access . . . and there is no
arguing that sports are best live.” Gaining Yards, AEREO (Feb. 24, 2012), http://perma.cc/DP5HNVVJ.
13
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As indicated above, the technology worked by combining thousands of thumbnail-sized,
independently-functioning antennas with cloud-based recording and storage functionality.20
The system was based around copies, which were made regardless of whether a subscriber
requested to “watch” a broadcast (for near-live viewing) or “record” it (for future
consumption). When a subscriber launched a request for either service, by clicking on a
program in the electronic programming guide that Aereo offered its customers, Aereo’s
servers would allocate a personal antenna and transcoder to the requesting user. 21 The
servers would then instruct the antenna to tune in to the relevant broadcast frequency and
create a new directory in which to store the recording.22 Since users were typically assigned
a new antenna for each transaction, many different individuals accessed the same antenna
over time.23 However, no two users were ever assigned the same antenna simultaneously,
and recordings made while an antenna was assigned to a particular user were never available
to any other subscriber.24 This system meant that, if 10,000 users all requested the same
program to be recorded, 10,000 antennas would separately tune in to it, and unique copies
would be made for each.25 If a user had selected “watch,” the recording would be discarded
once she finished watching (unless she chose to keep it); “recorded” programs would not be
automatically discarded.26 Users of either method were able to commence playback of the
recording as it was being made, and the recording enabled them to pause and rewind “live”
broadcasts.27
B. What Made the Law Vulnerable to Aereo’s Challenge?
Viewed in technical isolation, Aereo’s design looks clumsy and wasteful. Why utilize
thousands of antennae and copies when just one of each could achieve the same end? Why
make copies at all for subscribers who simply want to watch a program live? Viewed
through the lens of recent judicial interpretation of the U.S. copyright law, however, the
design comes into focus as logical and even rather elegant. Aereo’s service implicated two of
the copyright owner’s exclusive rights—those concerning public performance and
reproduction—but was designed to fall outside the scope of those rights as recently
interpreted by U.S. courts.28

20

Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding
that each antenna functioned independently). This finding was not appealed. See WNET, Thirteen v.
Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).
21
Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
22
Id. at 378.
23
Note, however, that users with ‘static’ subscriptions are generally assigned the same antennas on an
ongoing basis. See id. at 377–78.
24
Id. at 378.
25
It appears that three different copies of each program are actually made, of different quality,
allowing a user to choose the one best suited to the Internet connection she is using. Hearst Stations
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 35 (D. Mass 2013).
26
Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78.
27
Id. at 377.
28
Amended Answer and Counterclaim at 1, WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (Nos. 12-cv-1540 & 12-cv-1543), 2012 WL 3019466 (“Aereo merely provides the Aereo
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1. The Public Performance Right
Section 106(4) grants the copyright owner in motion pictures and various other works the
exclusive right to perform them publicly. 29 The Copyright Act defines “perform” as “to
recite, render, play, dance, or act [the work], either directly or by means of any device or
process, or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in
any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” 30 Performances must be
“contemporaneously perceptible;” this requirement distinguishes delivery of a download
from the delivery of a stream.31 In the latter instance, the user sees and/or hears the work as it
is being communicated to her; in the former, she will not experience the work’s contents
unless she subsequently summons the work from her computer’s memory.
The Act also defines “[t]o perform or display a work “publicly” in relevant part as:
[B]y transmitting or otherwise communicating a performance or display of the work . . .
to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times.32
This provision, known as the transmit clause, generally applies to electronic transmissions.
The Copyright Act defines to “transmit” a performance or display of the work as “to
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the
place from which they are sent.” 33 “Devices” and “processes” expressly include those
developed after the law came into effect.34
a. The Cablevision Precedent
Aereo built its system in reliance on the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the transmit clause
in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings. That litigation concerned the legality of Cablevision’s
“Remote Storage DVR System” (RS-DVR), which worked the same way as a regular digital

Technology that consumers may use to do what they are legally entitled to do: (1) access free and
legally accessible over-the-air television broadcasts using an antenna; (2) create individual, unique
recordings of those broadcasts for personal use, see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); and (3) record and play back those unique recordings utilizing a remotelylocated digital video recorder (“DVR”) to personal devices. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).”) This paper focuses on the ways in which Aereo was
designed to skirt the contours of the public performance right. For a more detailed discussion of how
it also sought to sidestep the reproduction right, see Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note *, at 5–6.
29
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).
30
Id. § 101.
31
United States v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors, Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2010). The
Supreme Court in Aereo confirmed the requirement that the work be contemporaneously visible or
audible at the time of its transmission. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct.
2498, 2508 (2014).
32
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
33
Id.
34
Id.
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video recorder (DVR), except that, instead of the consumer recording the programming onto
the hard disk of a device in her home, Cablevision’s service would record it onto a
customer’s allotted storage space on one of its central servers. 35 Separate recordings would
be made for each subscriber who requested one.36 To play the recordings, a customer could
select the desired program using her remote control, and the recording stored on her portion
of the central hard disk would be streamed to her television via her cable set-top box.37 This
system closely replicated the functionality of a traditional DVR—but also resembled a videoon-demand service. 38 The principal difference between the two technologies was that
programs accessed via the RS-DVR had to be requested to be recorded in advance of their
airtime, whereas video-on-demand content does not.39
Cablevision obtained no licenses for these activities and contended that it was under no
obligation to do so. 40 Right holders disagreed, arguing that Cablevision infringed their
exclusive rights to perform publicly and reproduce their works. Notably, the parties reached
a deal to leave certain issues off the table in the resulting litigation: the plaintiffs did not
claim secondary infringement, and in exchange, Cablevision waived any defenses based on
its customers’ possible fair use.41
There was no dispute that performances were occurring as part of the Cablevision process,
but the parties disagreed about who performed them, and whether or not they were public.
Cablevision’s contention that the performances were not public turned on its assertion that
the source copies for the individual transmissions had been “made” by the subscribers and
that, because each playback transmission was launched from each user’s private copy, the
performances too could only be private.42
At trial, Judge Chin (sitting prior to his elevation to the Second Circuit) found that
Cablevision’s involvement in the process was sufficient to justify a finding that it “made” the
copies stored on its servers as well as the transmissions from those copies, and that the
transmissions were “public” within the meaning of the Act.43
The Second Circuit reversed. It determined that the copies, albeit created using Cablevision’s
facilities and stored on its servers, were “made” by the subscribers who selected the programs
from among the offerings proposed by Cablevision.44 In reaching that decision, the court
35

Detailed descriptions of the Cablevision RS-DVR are set out in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2008), and Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
36
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
37
Id. at 615–16.
38
Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 125.
39
Id.
40
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
41
Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124.
42
Id. at 126.
43
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 622–23.
44
Before determining who “makes” the copies stored on the Cablevision servers, the Second Circuit
ruled that the “buffer” copies that Cablevision made in the process of delivering the content from its
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approvingly cited Netcom, a 1995 Northern District of California decision that declined to
hold an Internet service provider (ISP) directly liable when its facilities automatically
reproduced a copyrighted work that had been posted by one of its users.45 The Netcom court
reasoned that, despite copyright’s strict liability standard, “there should still be some element
of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create
a copy by a third party.”46
Having determined that the customers “made” the copies using Cablevision’s
instrumentalities, the Second Circuit then considered whether a transmission of a
performance from the customer’s individual source copy could be a “public” performance. It
first had to identify the “performance” referred to by the transmit clause. This has been the
subject of a great deal of controversy, stemming largely from a perceived grammatical
ambiguity within the text.47 By stating that “[t]o perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public,” the
statute defines the act of transmitting a performance as one type of performing, even though
the terms “to perform” and “to transmit” are separately defined as well. 48 This overlap
creates uncertainty as to whether the relevant performance is the performance created by the
act of the transmission, as Cablevision argued, or the performance of the underlying work,
the position taken by the broadcaster plaintiffs.49
The Second Circuit ultimately held that, in the context of transmitting a performance to the
public, Congress was referring “to the performance created by the act of transmission.” 50
Having accepted that the transmission was the relevant performance, the Second Circuit
reasoned that, since each RS-DVR transmission is made from a unique copy to a single
subscriber, those performances could not be “to the public.” 51 Certiorari was sought and
denied.52
Cablevision is crucial to understanding why Aereo’s technological design is not just logical,
but perhaps even inevitable. Simply, it appears to instruct technology providers that, if they
design their systems to enable each user to make unique personal copies, that structure could,
in appropriate cases, effectively immunize the services from any liability under both the
reproduction and the public performance rights. Although the Second Circuit expressly
cautioned that its holding “d[id] not generally permit content delivery networks to avoid all
copyright liability by making copies of each item of content and associating one unique copy
real-time signal to its subscribers’ storage boxes on its servers were not sufficiently “fixed” in the
buffers to amount to copies. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 127–30.
45
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal 1995).
46
Id. at 1370.
47
Cf. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 135–39 (discussing and comparing differing interpretations of the
transmit clause).
48
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
49
Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134.
50
Id. at 136.
51
Id. at 138.
52
Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 557 U.S. 946 (2009).
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with each subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers the capacity to make their
own individual copies,”53 the Second Circuit’s subsequent decision in Aereo demonstrates
that this admonition did not, in fact, confine that court’s reading of the statute.
b. Aereo’s Treatment in the Lower Courts
The district court ruled that Cablevision controlled, and that Aereo had therefore not
“publicly performed” the television programs. 54 A divided Second Circuit affirmed. The
Second Circuit majority reiterated its view that “the relevant inquiry under the Transmit
Clause is the potential audience of a particular transmission, not the potential audience for the
underlying work or the particular performance of that work being transmitted.”55 It also held
that there were “two essential facts” that had led to the holding that Cablevision’s
transmissions were not public performances: (1) that its RS-DVR allowed each subscriber to
create unique copies of each program and (2) that the transmission of the recording to a
subscriber was from that unique copy.56 These features meant that “the potential audience of
every RS-DVR transmission was only a single Cablevision subscriber, namely the subscriber
who created the copy,” and that limitation meant that the transmission was not “to the
public.”57 Aereo’s system had those same two features.58
In dissent, Judge Chin (since elevated to the Second Circuit) charged that Aereo’s technical
architecture was “a sham”:
The system employs thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there is no
technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual antennas rather than
one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, overengineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take
advantage of a perceived loophole in the law. 59
Rejecting the contention that holding that Aereo’s transmissions were not public
performances would be “exalt[ing] form over substance, because the Aereo system is
functionally equivalent to a cable television provider,”60 the majority nonetheless rejoined,
‘”[T]hat Aereo was able to design a system based on Cablevision’s holding to provide its
users with nearly live television over the internet is an argument that Cablevision was
wrongly decided; it does not provide a basis for distinguishing Cablevision.”61 The majority
noted that many other technology providers, particularly cloud computing services, had also
designed their systems around Cablevision’s holdings. 62 “Perhaps the application of the
53

Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 139.
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
55
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 691 (2d Cir. 2013).
56
Id. at 689.
57
Id. at 689–90 (internal citations omitted).
58
Id. at 690.
59
Id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).
60
Id. at 693 (majority opinion).
61
Id. at 694.
62
Id.
54
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Transmit Clause should focus less on the technical details of a particular system and more on
its functionality, but this Court’s decisions . . . held that technical architecture matters.”63
Acknowledging that it is more difficult to distinguish between public and private
transmissions today than when Congress enacted the transmit clause in 1976, the majority
ultimately concluded that the language of the Act, as previously interpreted in Cablevision,
dictated the conclusion that Aereo’s transmissions were not public performances.64

II. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court reversed, with a six-to-three majority (Breyer, joined by Roberts,
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan) holding that Aereo’s near-live service infringed
the broadcasters’ exclusive right of public performance.65 Three justices dissented.
The Court articulated two questions:
A. Did Aereo perform at all?
B. If yes, did it do so “to the public”?
A. Did Aereo Perform?
One of the crucial questions before the Court was who performed the works—Aereo, or the
individual subscribers who requested that the recordings of the broadcasts be made and
streamed? That question was the source of the judicial split. The dissent (Scalia, joined by
Thomas and Alito) urged that Aereo did not perform at all since it lacked the requisite
volition.66 The dissenters distinguished video-on-demand services, which exercise volition in
the selection of content offered to consumers, from automated retransmission services, which
simply relay an upstream transmission entity’s selection of programming proposed to users. 67
The majority, however, reached the opposite conclusion. While noting that the language of
the Act alone does not provide any demarcation between entities that themselves “perform”
and those that merely supply equipment enabling others to do so, the majority found that,
“read in light of its purpose, the Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in activities like
Aereo’s performs.”68 In an analysis that did not mention the concept of volition at all, the
majority reasoned that Aereo’s activities were essentially akin to the activities of the
community antenna television (CATV) providers that Congress had intended to cover in the
1976 Act:

63

Id.
Id. at 695.
65
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
66
Id. at 2512–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67
Id. at 2514.
68
Id. at 2504 (majority opinion).
64
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Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that
Congress amended the Act to reach. . . . Aereo sells a service that allows
subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, almost
as they are being broadcast. In providing this service, Aereo uses its own
equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes. By
means of its technology (antennas, transcoders, and servers), Aereo’s system
“receive[s] programs that have been released to the public and carr[ies] them by
private channels to additional viewers.”69
This holding is a narrow one. It instructs that a service will not be deemed a mere
“equipment provider” when it is sufficiently analogous to a CATV operator, but the decision
provides little guidance about whether and when a technology provider will be sufficiently
involved in the infringement to justify the imposition of direct liability outside those
circumstances.70
B. Were Those Performances “to the Public”?
The majority next considered whether those performances were “to the public” within the
meaning of the Act.
Congress defined two different kinds of public performances. One type is defined in the
transmit clause, discussed above.71 The Act also provides that “[t]o perform or display a
work “publicly” means . . . to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered . . . .”72
The two discrete limbs of the definition aim at very different activities. The first seeks to
capture performances that are in public. The second targets performances transmitted to
places that may be public or private but, in either event, are to be received by “members of
the public” and therefore are to the public. In the case of performances transmitted to the
public for receipt in private places, case law and secondary authority establish that a
“substantial number of persons” need not, in fact, have received the transmission; rather it
suffices that the performance of the work be offered to “members of the public.”73

69

Id. at 2506.
Cf. id. at 2511 (“We cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit Clause or other provisions
of the Copyright Act will apply to technologies not before us.”).
71
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
72
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
73
Some authorities have also pointed out the commercial character of transmissions held to have been
made to “members of the public.” See, e.g., On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991). In Cablevision I and in his dissent in Aereo II, Judge Chin cited
the commercial character of the relationship to buttress his determination that the transmissions were
to “paying strangers,” and thus “to the public.” See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc.(Aereo II), 722
F.3d 676, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision
Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Giblin & Ginsburg,
70
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The decision of the Northern District of California in On Command Video most squarely
confronts the distinction between the two limbs. The court analyzed whether the electronic
deliveries, upon request from a guest, of video signals to hotel rooms from a bank of cassette
players in the hotel’s equipment room amounted to transmissions to “the public.”74 The hotel
had structured its service so that no two guests could simultaneously view the content from
the same cassette. The district court, following Ninth Circuit precedent,75 recognized that
performances in hotel rooms did not occur “in” public places, 76 but held that the video
transmissions were nonetheless “to the public” for the purposes of the transmit clause
because “the relationship between the transmitter of the performance . . . and the audience . . .
is a commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of where the viewing takes place.” 77 The
relationship was “a commercial, ‘public’ one” because, while only one or two persons would
occupy the room at any given time, members of the public were generally invited to become
paying guests of the hotel.78
In Aereo, the Supreme Court majority departed from this delineation by using the text of the
first limb to help it define “the public” for the purposes of the second. It explained that,
although the Act does not define “the public,” it specifies that an entity performs publicly
when it performs at “any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.” 79 After repeatedly emphasizing
the importance of transmissions directed to a “large” group of people in order to be “to the
public,” the Court concluded that “an entity does not transmit to the public if it does not
transmit to a substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle.”80
Thus, the Court’s treatment of “the public” for purposes of the transmit clause might be read
as requiring actual transmission “to a substantial number of people outside of a family and its
social circle,” implying both that a transmission must have been made, not merely offered,
and that the audience receiving the transmission must be comprised of many persons.81 Such
a reading would have serious and troubling implications. Imagine a situation in which an
entity offers to transmit the work to the public at large, or to the relevant public for the work,
but few members of that public actually choose to listen or watch. Does it follow that only
those entities that cross an unspecified threshold of actual transmissions are “publicly
performing”? If so, then the “public” nature of a performance by transmission could not be
supra note *, at 28–29; infra text accompanying notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–Error!
Bookmark not defined..
74
On Command Video, 777 F. Supp. 787.
75
The Ninth Circuit had held that a hotel’s “rental” of videocassettes to its customers for viewing in
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the public.” Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. Prof’l. Real Estate Invs., Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 281 (9th
Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
76
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See id.
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ascertained without post-hoc head-counting. Not only would such an interpretation introduce
uncertainty for copyright owners and exploiters alike, but it promotes the kinds of baroque
copyright-avoiding business models the Aereo Court discredited. Given the Copyright Act’s
inclusion in the public performance right of discrete transmissions to the public that are
separated in time, were the public performance right to turn on receipt of the transmission by
a substantial number of persons, then the service might be permitted to make an
“insubstantial” number of on-demand transmissions before the number of transmissions
tipped over into communicating the performance of the work to a “substantial” number of
unrelated persons. If the service is in effect allowed up to, say, fifty “free” transmissions,
then one might imagine the creation of a plethora of separately constituted subsidiary services
each catering to no more than fifty members of the public.
However, we do not believe that the Court’s judgment leads to this outcome. While the
definition of “transmit” speaks in terms of actual communications of performances, the
transmit clause itself refers to “members of the public capable of receiving the performance
or display.”82 The “members of the public” capable of receiving the performance could be
the public at large, or smaller subsets, such as devotees of cooking shows, or the fans of even
a particularly obscure performer; what matters is that the potential audience be otherwise
unrelated to the copyright owner or to each other. By the same token, even if a service
structures the transmission so that only one person may ever receive it (for example, as a
“private” live stream from a concert performance), but solicits members of the public to
attempt to be the lucky winner, the performance still would be made to a “member of the
public.” The statutory language of the second limb focuses on whether the transmission is
offered to people in their capacity as members of the public, rather than on the number of
actual recipients.
Significantly, the Aereo Court did not in fact engage in the head-counting exercise its
analysis could be read as requiring. It did not inquire into how many of Aereo’s users
actually accessed each broadcast, nor suggest that those numbers may be significant to its
finding of infringement. As recent data show, Aereo had less than 80,000 subscribers across
ten cities as of late 2013.83 Presumably then, at least some protected works would have been
streamed by just one or a handful of users. Perhaps some works attracted no users at all. Had
the Court really intended public performance liability to turn on numerous actual recipients
rather than on the offer of transmissions, and on the nature of the audience to which the offer
was directed, in making its determination of liability the Court could have been expected to
differentiate between content merely offered and content actually transmitted.
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The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that Congress anticipated the possibility that
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Justice Breyer’s statement of the controversy at the beginning of his judgment may also
suggest that it is the offering of the content rather than its actual receipt that is legally
significant:
We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes this exclusive right [of
public performance] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service
that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same
time as the programs are broadcast over the air. We conclude that it does.84
This language suggests that what triggers the infringement is the provision of a service that
“allows” subscribers to view the programs, not the viewings themselves. This interpretation
would be consistent with the United States’ international obligations. Article 8 of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty obliges member states to protect
the copyright holders’ right of communication to the public, “including the making available
to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works
from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.” In Europe, in construing the EU
Information Society Directive’s identical language, the Court of Justice of the European
Union has ruled that the “public” character of the “making available” right turns on whether
the defendant has offered the work to a “large number of persons”—not whether it has in fact
been received.85 Thus, “a work is made available to a public in such a way that the persons
forming that public may access it, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that
opportunity.”86
For all of these reasons, the Aereo Court’s holding is likely to be more nuanced than an initial
reading might suggest. Providers will not be liable in damages for merely making available a
service that might be used to transmit content. There would be no monetary relief for public
performances of works that have not actually been communicated to someone because in
those cases there would be no “performance.” However, once a performance has occurred, it
should not matter how many individuals actually received it, only whether it was available to
a “large” or “substantial” number.87 And, of course, to enjoin prospective performances, it is

Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2503. Similarly: “Considered alone, the language of the Act does not
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not necessary that the performance have occurred; the author would have an action to prevent
the on-demand transmission to the public of streams of copyrighted works even if no member
of the public has yet requested the transmission. But while we find the Court’s requirement
that the audience be large necessarily refers to the potential audience, any size criterion is still
likely to be problematic for reasons we explore more fully below.
C. Considerations Countering a Finding of “Public” Performance
Two additional wrinkles in the majority’s analysis of what it means for a performance to be
“to the public” prompt further queries. First, it stated that “those who act as owners or
possessors of the relevant product” do not constitute “the public.”88 Second, the majority
noted, without further explanation, that “the doctrine of ‘fair use’ can help to prevent
inappropriate or inequitable applications of the Clause.”89
1. “Owners or Possessors”
The Court accompanied its observation that “those who act as owners or possessors of the
relevant product” do not constitute “the public” with the further explanation that, “when an
entity performs to a set of people, whether they constitute ‘the public’ often depends upon
their relationship to the underlying work.”90
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a U.S. court has recognized the relevance
of the nature of the relationship between the copyrighted work or copyright owner and the
audience. Case law considering the meaning of “the public” in this context has been
surprisingly spare, but what authorities exist have, until now, focused on the relationship
between the performing entity and the audience. For example, as described above, the court
in On Command Video held that the video transmissions were indeed “to the public” for the
purposes of the transmit clause because “the relationship between the transmitter of the
performance . . . and the audience . . . is a commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of where the
viewing takes place.”91 Paul Goldstein agrees that the relationship between the sender and
the recipient is vital in determining whether a transmission is “to the public”:
In the case of a transmission to a guest house, the relationship between the
homeowner and the recipients of the transmission is not one between an individual
and the public, rather is between an individual and his friends or family. By contrast,
the relationship between a trailer court manager and guests in the court is one between
an individual and the public, as it is in the case of a hotel and its guests.92

performance might potentially be obtained from the transmitting entities’ server logs, records
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Judge Chin adopted On Command when he decided Cablevision at first instance, 93 and
further highlighted the importance of the relationship between the transmitter and the
audience in his Aereo dissent. There, he reasoned that “a transmission to anyone other than
oneself or an intimate relation is a communication to a ‘member[] of the public,’ because it is
not in any sense ‘private.’”94 Thus, Aereo’s transmissions were “to the public” because they
were being disseminated to “paying strangers”; it was irrelevant that the potential audience of
each transmission was restricted to a single member of the public.95
While pre-Aereo authorities squarely emphasized the relationship between the sender and
recipient of the performance to determine whether it has been made “to the public,” we have
previously argued that the relationship between the recipient of the transmission and a copy
of the copyrighted work is crucial.96 The Supreme Court’s observation that whether or not
recipients of a transmission are “the public” often depends upon their relationship to the
underlying work suggests that this heretofore neglected consideration is now indeed an
important part of the analysis.
Unfortunately, however, the significance of that factor is not yet clear. The Court’s reference
to “owners or possessors” is, at best, very imprecise; the service’s customer is unlikely to be
an owner of “the work” because “the work” is the incorporeal object whose “owner” is the
author or other copyright owner. Presumably, based on the submissions by the amicus curiae
briefs, including the United States’,97 the Court was positing the request by a customer of a
remote storage service to play back a digital copy that she was entitled—by express or
implied license, or under the fair use doctrine—to deposit in a digital storage locker. In that
event, even if multiple customers separately stored the same content with the service, the
latter’s subsequent on-demand playback of performances of the same work to those
customers would not be a transmission to “the public” by the service or the customer: “the
term ‘the public’ . . . does not extend to those who act as owners or possessors of the relevant
product.” 98 “Product” in this context apparently includes a license to access the stored
content, whether by uploading it from a physical copy that its owner lawfully digitized, or by
purchasing a download subsequently stored on a remote source. 99 When a digital storage
service plays content acquired and stored by customers back to those customers, then, there is
no public performance.
Moreover, in addition to the customer’s entitlement to access (which the Court treated as a
possessory relationship) to the customer-stored content, the Court introduced a further
93
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consideration: “And we have not considered whether the public performance right is
infringed when the user of a service pays primarily for something other than the transmission
of copyrighted works, such as the remote storage of content.”100 There, the Court appears to
be focusing on the nature of the commercial relationship between the customer and the
transmitting service. Remote storage services transmit content to members of the public
(their subscribers) when files hosted on their servers are played back to users on request.101
Unlike pay (or listen) on demand, however, the service for which the members of the public
are paying is not the opportunity to receive transmissions of performances of particular works
offered by the service, but rather to store whatever content the users post—whatever its
source—and make it accessible remotely. The customers pay the same subscription fees
whatever the content they store and access. Thus, while there is a public that pays in dollars
or by being subjected to advertising (or other costs of “free” commercial services), 102 the
public is not specifically paying for transmissions of performances of any given copyrighted
works.
Whether a service is performing “publicly,” then, appears to turn on the nature of the service
for which customers are paying. Any service’s customers are likely to be members of the
public, but the same act by the service— transmitting a performance of a given work— may
or may not be a public performance depending on the existence of some kind of possessory
relationship between the individual members of the public and a copy of or a license to use
the content, and depending on whether the service is primarily offering streaming access to
service-specified copyrighted works.
2. Fair Use
The majority also posited that in appropriate cases, even if the service is deemed to be
“publicly performing” third party content, the fair use doctrine might excuse the transmission
and thus “prevent inappropriate or inequitable applications of the Clause.”103 The majority
did not, however, go on to apply that doctrine to the Aereo facts, thereby indicating that it did
not think Aereo presented even an arguable case for fair use. As a result, whether other, less
cable-like, storage and transmission services might be engaging in fair use is left to future
controversies.
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III. Questions and Implications
The Court’s narrowly-phrased decision leaves the precise scope of the transmit clause
uncertain. Among the questions the opinion raises, we analyze the following:
A. What does the Court’s decision mean for the “volition” predicate introduced by
the Second Circuit? Who “makes” the copies and transmissions?
B. Would otherwise identical services that offer delayed timeshifting (and no nearlive transmissions) also be “performing publicly”?
C. What are the implications of the decision for other technology providers, including
cloud storage providers, that look less like cable TV operators?
A. What Does Aereo Mean for “Volition”?
Transmissions?

Who “Makes” the Copies and

1. Volition and Transmission
Remarkably, the Aereo majority did not mention the concept of volition at all. That silence in
the face of the dissenters’ emphatic interpolation of a “volition” predicate might suggest that
the majority considers volition irrelevant to the assessment of whether the defendant has
publicly performed a work. The majority’s analysis of whether Aereo “perform[s] at all”
distinguishes between the mere provision of equipment and “engag[ing] in activities like
Aereo’s.”104 The majority underscored Congress’ rejection in the 1976 Act of the Court’s
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Systems, Inc. precedents. 105 In those decisions, the Court had held that
traditional cable TV retransmission services were not “performing” the works that the
services retransmitted to their customers because the customers chose which programs to
watch, and the services were merely providing equipment that the customers might
themselves have installed (given the Court’s rather fanciful evocation of the customers’ acts,
such as placing an aerial on a mountaintop and stringing a wire from the mountaintop to the
customer’s home).106 Congress’ subsequent amendment of the Copyright Act was intended
to ensure that cable operators were considered “perform[ers]” of the retransmitted works and
therefore fell within the scope of the Act. 107 According to the Aereo Court, a service
“performs” copyrighted works, rather than simply supplies equipment, when it “uses its own
equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes,” to transmit
104
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performances of works to viewers, even when that equipment “may . . . emulate equipment a
viewer could use at home,” and even when the customers selected which particular programs
to watch from among the totality of the broadcasts the service made available for
retransmission.108 The majority therefore appears to stress the service’s active engagement in
the transmission, and its similarity to the CATV providers whose activities the Act was
intended to cover, rather than any specific “volition” with respect to the particular content
transmitted.
Indeed, the majority’s rejection of the dissent’s characterization of Aereo’s service as “a copy
shop that provides its patrons with a library card,” 109 underscores the irrelevance of the
customer’s program selection to the determination of whether the service has “performed” the
works it transmits. The Court also declined to attribute any significance to the additional
layer of consumer intervention involved in Aereo’s system relative to cable systems: while
cable systems retransmit sua sponte, Aereo does not activate the subscriber’s antenna without
the subscriber’s request. Adopting a pragmatic perspective, the Court announced that “this
difference means nothing to the subscriber. It means nothing to the broadcaster.”110
Nonetheless, the Court did not completely discount the role of the user in the determination
of “who performs” a work: “a user’s involvement in the operation of the provider’s
equipment and selection of the content transmitted may well bear on whether the provider
performs within the meaning of the Act.”111 This statement is a far cry from adopting the
kind of “volition” predicate urged by the dissent (or, for that matter, by the Second Circuit in
Cablevision), but it nonetheless suggests that when the service is less “cable-like” than Aereo,
the majority’s distinction between providing the equipment that enables a performance, and
actually “performing,” remains uncertain.
In any event, it should be clear, even under the dissent’s characterization, that specific
“volition” as to the transmission of particular content is not required for the communication
to be considered a “public performance.” All justices agree that video on-demand services
are “performing,” and it should not matter how automated the process: once the service
assembles the selection of the programs from which the consumer may choose and then
offers them commercially to the public, the service has gone beyond merely providing
transmission facilities. For the majority, cable and cable-like services still “perform” even
though they did not originate the selection of programming offered to the users (the
broadcasters did, though the cable operators select the source broadcast stations whose
content they retransmit), and even though the users ultimately choose which programs to
108
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watch, by turning a knob on the television, or clicking on a website. (Of course, the last
feature of user involvement is common to on-demand transmissions, too.) If on-demand
services occupy one end of the “who performs” continuum, and cable-like services stand at
an intermediate—but still “performing”—point, services that offer remote storage (but are
entirely agnostic as to the content users store) might be located at the other end.
2. “Volition” and the Reproduction Right
While Aereo addressed only the public performance right, the majority’s opinion raises
questions about the continued application of the “volition” standard to the reproduction right.
The majority provided no explicit guidance about the circumstances in which a technology
provider will be taken to have engaged in the relevant act except where they are closely
analogous to CATV providers. The dissent criticized the majority’s reasoning on this point
for, among other things, bypassing the volitional conduct test without providing any useful
framework to replace it.112 In the absence of any such guidance, future courts may adopt a
hybrid standard: that Aereo applies where the defendant is sufficiently cable-like, and the
volition standard prevails in other cases. We consider the implications of the majority
decision for the future operation of “volition” in the technical analysis below and in our
debate about the merits of the decision.

B. Would Otherwise Identical Services that Offer Delayed Timeshifting (and No NearLive Transmissions) Also Be “Performing Publicly”?
The Supreme Court’s decision covered only Aereo’s near-live offering. It did not address
Aereo’s timeshifting facility, which enables users to record a program for viewing at a more
convenient time. 113 In the remand proceedings, Aereo argued that any injunction should
exclude that aspect of its service, and that transmissions would be sufficiently delayed to fall
outside the scope of the Supreme Court’s ruling if they started streaming as little as ten
minutes after the original broadcast commenced airing.114 The district court instead issued an
injunction barring Aereo from transmitting any program while it was still being broadcast,
reserving for determination at trial questions about the legality of transmissions made after
broadcast. 115 Aereo has now filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and it appears
unlikely that there will be any such trial.116
Whether or not Aereo would have been liable for transmitting pre-recorded programs after
they finished airing would have depended on whether Aereo was found to be the performer of
those transmissions, and, if so, whether the performances are “to the public.” The answer to
112
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those questions would apply equally to neighboring technologies like Cablevision’s RS-DVR,
which similarly utilizes remotely hosted equipment to make recordings that are later
transmitted to the user for watching at a more convenient time. In determining the legality of
that product in 2008, the Second Circuit had ruled that the relevant performance was the
specific transmission made from each unique copy and reasoned that, since the audience of
that transmission could only be a specific individual, the transmission could not be “to the
public.”117 The Second Circuit did not consider who engaged in those performances, because
its finding that the performances were not “public” obviated that issue. 118 Now that the
Second Circuit’s analysis of the “public” character of the performances is no longer good law
post-Aereo, it is useful to consider whether the Supreme Court’s holdings mean that other
kinds of providers of remote timeshifting services would be “performing publicly.”
The technology that underpins Aereo’s near-live and prospective delayed offerings is exactly
the same. 119 In both instances, recordings are made and then streamed online to the
requesting viewer. The only real difference is that the timeshifting viewer watches those
recordings at a later time. But even though nothing changes other than the lapse of time
between the original broadcast and its subsequent retransmission by the service that recorded
the broadcast, the majority’s reasoning could yield a different answer to the questions both of
“who performs” the work, and of whether the performance is “to the public.” The following
analysis attempts to answer those questions based on a hypothetical version of Aereo that
would permit users to stream back their requested recordings only after the programs finish
airing.
1. Who “Performs” the Timeshifted Transmissions?
The Supreme Court majority held Aereo to be the performer of the near-live transmissions
because its activities in that regard were so similar to those of the cable companies the Act
was amended to reach. The majority did not perceive sufficient pertinence in the “sole
technological difference” between cable retransmission systems and Aereo itself—that
Aereo’s system did not transmit until activated by the subscriber: “this difference means
nothing to the subscriber. It means nothing to the broadcaster.”120 By contrast, the majority
acknowledged that “[i]n other cases involving different kinds of service or technology
providers, a user’s involvement in the operation of the provider’s equipment and selection of
the content transmitted may well bear on whether the provider performs within the meaning
of the Act.”121 But the majority did not elaborate on what these “other cases” might be.
In the case of the delayed timeshifting services provided by both Aereo (hypothetically) and
Cablevision (in fact), the system neither transmits until activation by a subscriber, nor permits
117
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subscribers to watch recordings of programs as they are simultaneously being broadcast, nor
determines when the subscriber may watch the programs.122 Thus, the parallel to the CATV
providers of the 1970s arguably reduces to the services’ common use of their own equipment
(stored in centralized warehouses). Would that factor in itself be sufficient to support a
finding that the service was the performer? It is our view that a service provider might be
considered closely analogous to a cable provider even where it transmits content only after it
has finished airing. For example, were Aereo to offer to automatically begin its timeshifted
transmissions directly after the initial broadcast, so that subscribers could in effect
continuously stream TV with a slight delay, a court may find that Aereo still looks
sufficiently analogous to such a provider.
Once the cable TV provider analogy fails, however, perhaps because of too great a lapse of
time between the original broadcast and its subsequent retransmission (how great is “too
great” remaining undefined), Aereo’s reliance on kinship to cable provides only limited
comfort to plaintiffs wishing to make a case that remote DVR providers themselves “perform.”
The Aereo Court carefully avoided giving any explicit guidance about “who performs” in
circumstances outside the cable TV analogy. 123 The Court left the scope of its decision
ambiguous by stating that “the history of cable broadcast transmissions that led to the
enactment of the Transmit Clause informs our conclusion that Aereo ‘perform[s],’ but it does
not determine whether different kinds of providers in different contexts also ‘perform.’”124
This remark does not warrant a negative inference that different providers in different
contexts do not perform. It does not necessarily follow that only those remote transmission
services that can be assimilated to cable services are “performing” the works they transmit.
We can identify some additional factors that might in future cases be deemed relevant to
determining who “performs.” As discussed above, in finding Aereo to be the performer in
the case of its near-live TV service, the Court focused on Aereo’s active engagement in the
transmissions.125 The timeshifting services supplied by Aereo and Cablevision not only store
and play back works, but also initially propose that content to their subscribers. 126 As a result,
they closely resemble video-on-demand services. The principal difference is the constitution
In the case of Cablevision’s RS-DVR, we make this assumption on the basis of the Second
Circuit’s explanations of that technology in its 2008 judgment. There it was explained that
Cablevision would split the stream of data received from various content providers into two—one of
which would be immediately routed to customers in the same way as before the RS-DVR existed, and
the other of which would be diverted to a different server and from which copies would be made upon
request from subscribers. It may well be possible for a user to both view a program and record it at
the same time. However, the signals that the user is watching live would seem to fall within
Cablevision’s retransmission license. The public would not be able to watch the recorded copy as it
was being made—only play it back after broadcast. Accordingly, in this scenario (as for the case of
Aereo’s hypothetical timeshifting service) timeshifted copies could not be viewed until after the
recording is completed.
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of the selection of programming offered to subscribers; rather than assembling the offered
repertoire itself, the services act as conduits for the broadcasters’ selections. Third party
origination of the selection of programming suggests that timeshifting services have less
“volition” than a traditional video-on-demand provider, but nonetheless still have a
significant degree of active participation in the activity, particularly if the services select
among the broadcast channels whose programs the services record and retransmit. Whether
the addition of this conduct to the remote storage and transmission activities suffices to
characterize those services as “performing” the works is yet to be seen, but will no doubt be
vigorously argued by future plaintiffs.127
2. If the Remote Timeshifting Service Performs, Does It Do So “to the Public”?
Even if Aereo and Cablevision were found to be the performers of the timeshifted
transmissions, the majority’s analysis raises the further question whether, in the case of
delayed transmissions for the purpose of timeshifting, the services are performing “to the
public.”
The majority held that Aereo made its near-live transmissions “to the public” because it
transmitted them to large numbers of subscribers who lacked any prior relationship to the
works, and who were paying primarily to watch broadcast television programs.128 However,
Aereo’s and Cablevision’s timeshifting services record full copies of works to users’
individual storage lockers prior to the eventual delayed transmission,129 thus giving the users
some “prior relationship” to the works. If those users then receive the transmissions in their
capacities as lawful owners or possessors of the underlying works, that will be relevant to
whether they constitute “the public” for purposes of the subsequent transmission. 130 In
addition, those timeshifters are not paying primarily to watch near-live TV, but for the ability
to watch televised content at a more convenient time—something that the Supreme Court, in
a different technological environment, had previously held to be a fair use.131
The majority, having evoked fair use, did not explain why that exception did not exculpate
Aereo’s near-live transmissions.132 However, the Court’s finding that the service, rather than
127

We explore below, see infra text accompanying notes 234–238, the legal analysis of another way in
which Aereo might redesign its service to elude liability for public performances: rather than
streaming the content of the recorded programs to its subscribers (the Cablevision model), it might
simply transmit the file to the subscriber as a download, for the subscriber to subsequently open and
play. In this scenario, Aereo would be transmitting a file, not a “performance” (since the work would
not be contemporaneously perceptible with its communication). Whether Aereo’s response to its
subscriber’s request for delivery of the copy would violate the § 106(3) distribution right would
depend on whether the act of delivery is attributed to Aereo or to the subscriber. See 17 U.S.C. §
106(3) (2012).
128
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.
129
Id. at 2503; Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 125.
130
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.
131
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that consumer
uses of Sony’s Betamax VCR to timeshift free broadcast television programming are fair use).
132
See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.

22

the subscriber, engaged in the transmission may well have doomed a fair use defense. U.S.
law has traditionally operated less favorably to commercial service providers that act on a
user’s behalf than to the user herself. 133 Thus, copy shops may be liable for making
infringing copies, even if the copying would have amounted to educational fair use had it
been done by the ultimate user on her own behalf.134 In one such case the, Sixth Circuit
observed that “courts have . . . properly rejected attempts by for-profit users to stand in the
shoes of their customers making nonprofit or noncommercial uses.”135 In a subsequent case
involving the sale of karaoke discs, that court reiterated that “the end-user’s utilization of the
product is largely irrelevant; instead, the focus is on whether the alleged infringer’s use is
transformative and/or commercial.”136 Thus, while a viewer arguably has a fair use right to
stream local free-to-air content when she was freely entitled to do so via a rooftop antenna, it
is unlikely that Aereo had the right to do so, on the viewer’s behalf, for profit.
We have posited that the service’s involvement in the selecting, proposing, storing and
transmitting the content may potentially lead to its designation as the entity that “performs”
the work. Nonetheless, even if it is the provider that performs, the users’ prior relationship to
the works, and their payment for access to timeshifted works rather than to near-live
broadcast TV, may introduce sufficient distinctions to support a finding that those
performances are not “to the public.” But that conclusion depends on the assumption that the
copies were lawfully made by virtue of an end-user timeshifting fair use exception. In fact,
we should not treat Sony as imprimatur for any and all timeshifting whatsoever.137 Sony was
far from a blanket authorization of any and all consumer time-deferred copying of television
broadcasts. While the Sony Court assumed that consumers should be entitled to watch at
their convenience programming that they had been invited to view for free, 138 the Court
reached the conclusion that the copies made there were noninfringing only after considering
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market harm, cost and difficulty of copying, and the nonexistence of copyright ownersupplied alternatives to inconvenient broadcast times.139
Technologies such as Aereo are readily distinguishable from Sony’s Betamax. Most
importantly, they have much more potential to compete with remunerated markets for making
the same content conveniently available on demand (which have developed significantly
since the 1980s, now offering multiple alternative viewing opportunities to the original
broadcast time). Moreover, the technologies have eliminated a great deal of “friction” from
the copying process (notably, as in the case of Dish’s AutoHop service, by automatically
deleting the advertisements140). In an environment where there is less and less difference
between commercially-aided timeshifting and video on demand (which indubitably, even for
the dissenters, implicates the public performance right), the reflexive assumption that
timeshifting=fair use should be questioned. If users do not in fact have a legitimate,
possessory relationship to the content, under the Supreme Court’s reasoning, that may change
the performance into one to the “public.”

C. What Are the Implications of the Decision for Other Technology Providers?
One of the biggest concerns in the lead-up to the Supreme Court’s decision was the fear that a
finding against Aereo could impose enormous collateral damage upon other technology
providers, particularly the cloud storage industry. 141 The majority clearly expressed its
intention to draft its holding narrowly to avoid such outcomes.142 However, it declined to
elaborate on the implications of its holdings for most other kinds of Internet-based
enterprises.143 Here, we consider what the Supreme Court’s decision might mean for a range
of technology providers, including those that supply cloud storage, Slingboxes, “tablet TVs”
and live TV streaming, in order to tease out the boundaries of its ruling.
139
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1. Cloud Storage
Before the Supreme Court handed down its ruling, there was widespread concern that a
reading of the transmit clause that captured Aereo might also impose new liability on each
cloud provider whose users streamed copyright-protected works from their personal storage
“lockers.”144
Dropbox, one of the most popular online services, epitomizes the likely implications for
cloud storage providers. Dropbox’s pitch is simple—it offers “[y]our stuff, anywhere.”145
Dropbox copies and synchronizes content between multiple devices, and has been designed
to make those processes as simple as possible for users. 146 The subscriber needs only to
install the application, log in and start putting material in a folder.147 Dropbox then actively
monitors that folder, automatically copies and synchronizes users’ files across each of their
devices via the Internet once new content is added, and encrypts those files when they reach
its servers.148 Subscribers may then access it from phones, tablets and anywhere with an
Internet connection. Accounts are private: only the account owner or a person she has
expressly authorized may access the content stored within them.149
Imagine that a user records a broadcast of a particular NFL football game, and, intending to
watch it at a more convenient time, uploads that recording to her private Dropbox account.
When she later streams the recorded broadcast from her Dropbox, is Dropbox engaging in an
infringing public performance?
The starting point of the analysis under Aereo must be to ask who engages in the
transmission.150 Dropbox has little resemblance to the CATV providers the 1976 Act was
intended to capture. It does not sell a service that allows subscribers to watch television
programs; it sells a service that allows subscribers to remotely store any kind of content at all.
There is nothing about that service that is specifically designed to enable users to watch TV
simultaneously or near simultaneously with the broadcast. Dropbox does own and host the
storage equipment, but it does not provide the antenna or transcoder equipment necessary to
receive and convert the broadcast signals—those must be obtained elsewhere by the user.
And Dropbox does not propose the content to the users to store and play back. Given the
majority’s careful confinement of its “who performs?” analysis to technology providers
analogous to CATV providers, and its explicit reference to cloud storage providers in noting
that the right may not be infringed where service users “pay[] primarily for something other
144
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than the transmission of copyrighted works,”151 the Aereo judgment does not suggest that
Dropbox would be the one performing.
Even if Dropbox were “performing,” it seems unlikely that it would be doing so “to the
public.” Dropbox has millions of subscribers, 152 and presumably sometimes substantial
numbers of users with no relationship to one another do store and stream the same works.
However, those subscribers have a clear prior relationship to the work (in that they have
uploaded the file after making the initial recording) and, rather than paying Dropbox
primarily to watch copyright-protected works, they pay primarily for the benefit of that
storage. Accordingly, these performances would not be “to the public” and should therefore
fall outside the scope of the copyright owners’ exclusive rights. In our view, Aereo
successfully tailored its ruling to protect Dropbox-type cloud storage providers from public
performance liability.
2. “Slinging” Technologies Such as Hopper with Sling and TiVo Stream
The current generation of home DVRs that incorporate “slinging” technologies provides a
particularly intriguing case study in testing the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Slinging is the practice of shifting to another location content that consumers are entitled to
watch in a different place. 153 The original Slingbox was created by a pair of keen Giants
baseball fans who found it difficult to follow their team’s progress through the World Series
while they were travelling.154 They came up with a product that, when connected to the home
video source and network router, received the video signal, encoded it into a compressed
format and transmitted it online to another device on request, enabling users to access their
home TVs and DVRs from any other Internet-connected screen.155 Slinging does not involve
making copies of works, just retransmitting them elsewhere.156 Technical restrictions prevent
Slingboxes from placeshifting to more than one device at a time, and the use of passwords
and encryption further prevent shows from being “slung” to the public at large. 157 A number
of consumer products now incorporate such technology, including Dish’s Hopper with Sling
DVR and TiVo’s Stream and Roamio DVRs.158
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Dish has incorporated slinging technology in its DVRs in various forms since 2009.159 The
technology was recently challenged as part of Fox’s ongoing litigation against Dish’s Hopper
DVR technology.160 Dish attracted Fox’s ire in 2012 after launching a DVR with a feature
called PrimeTime Anytime. Once that feature is activated, it automatically records all prime
time programming from each of the four major broadcast networks and retains it for eight
days, effectively enabling subscribers to access prime time broadcast content on demand.161
A few months later, Dish added a new feature called AutoHop that worked with PrimeTime
Anytime to skip commercials. 162 If AutoHop was available, subscribers would be alerted
when watching the relevant recording.163 If they chose to automatically skip the commercials,
they would see just a few seconds from the beginning and end of an ad break.164 “Unlike the
30-second skip feature available on many DVRs, once a user has enabled AutoHop, the user
does not press anything to skip through commercials.”165
The court rejected Fox’s request for a preliminary injunction against Dish’s provision of the
PrimeTime Anytime and AutoHop features. 166 By that point, however, Dish had released
Hopper with Sling, a “second generation’” version of the Hopper that incorporated slinging
technology.167 Combined with the “Dish Anywhere” software, it enabled users to watch live
broadcast television on a remote device, watch prerecorded material stored on the DVR or
schedule future recordings.168 There are a number of key differences between Dish’s Hopper
with Sling and Cablevision’s RS-DVR. For one thing, no copies are ever made as part of the
transmission process.169 For another, the content is transmitted directly from the Hopper to
the remote device without passing through the service provider’s servers. 170 A third
difference is that the Hopper exists as a physical box in the hands of the subscriber: the
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recordings are stored on that box, and the “slung” transmissions emanate directly from it.171
Fox filed another motion seeking to shut down this second generation technology, arguing,
among other things, that Dish’s use of slinging technology infringed the right of public
performance.172
The Central District of California denied Fox’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief on the
ground that Fox had failed to show the likelihood of sufficient harm to warrant an injunction,
even were it likely to succeed on the merits of the case; the court gave no guidance as to
whether the public performance claim would be likely to succeed.173 On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, armed with the Supreme Court’s decision against Aereo that had been handed down
just a few days before, Fox argued that Dish “engages in virtually identical conduct when it
streams Fox’s programming to Dish subscribers over the Internet.” 174 Fox suggested that
Dish both engages in the relevant performances and that these were “to the public.” 175 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision, also without addressing the merits of the
public performance argument, which will have to be considered at trial.176 While other DVR
providers also incorporate slinging technology (including TiVo, in its Roamio Plus and Pro
versions), we focus our analysis on Dish’s liability for performances emanating from its
Hopper with Sling technology.
The Hopper with Sling is a device physically located in the home of each subscriber. 177
Subscribers lease the box from Dish at a current cost of twelve dollars per month, and Dish
continues to own the boxes for the lifetime of the arrangement.178 While it is possible to buy
one of the devices outright, subscribers will still be obliged to pay the same monthly device
fee: the only benefit of purchasing is to avoid being locked into a minimum contract term.179
The Hopper with Sling allows the transmission of copyright-protected content in the form of
live TV signals as well as material that has previously been recorded onto the DVR.180 While
essentially the same technology is used to deliver both types of performances, it is necessary

171

Id.
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Against Dish’s New 2013 Services at 2–3, Fox I, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (No. 12-04529), 2013 WL
646146.
173
Order Re Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction Re Dish’s New 2013 Services (Redacted
Version), supra note 168, at 14–15.
174
Letter from Richard L. Stone, Partner, Jenner & Block LLP, to Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk of the Court,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (June 25, 2014) (on file with the court).
175
Id.
176
Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C. (Fox IV), No. 13-56818, 2014 WL 3398107 (9th Cir.
July 14, 2014).
177
See Etherington, supra note 167.
178
A Dish sales representative further explained in a telephone conversation that when a device has
become obsolete or is otherwise no longer supported, in some instances the organization may gift it to
the subscriber. Telephone Interview with Dish Sales Dep’t Representative, Dish Network (Sept. 18,
2014). In all other cases, however, the DVRs continue to belong to the service provider. Id.
179
The Dish sales representative quoted an outright sale price for the device of $498. Id.
180
See Etherington, supra note 167.
172

28

to separate out those activities in order to apply the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court.
a. Who Engages in the Performances of Live TV?
The Supreme Court instructs us that a provider will be considered to have “performed”
(rather than merely provided the equipment for others to do so) at least where it is sufficiently
similar to the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to capture.181 In finding that
Aereo was sufficiently similar, the Court found it notable that the service Aereo sold was for
the near-live broadcast of TV, and that Aereo used its own equipment, housed centrally,
outside of its users’ homes.182
When it comes to the transmission of live TV, Dish has many similarities to Aereo. Both
providers are, at least in part, selling access to near-live broadcast TV. Both of them use their
own equipment to do so. The primary difference lies in the location of the equipment. While
Aereo’s equipment is housed centrally, Dish’s sits in each subscriber’s home. One further
difference is that Dish may not provide all of the relevant equipment. It is unclear whether
Dish’s technology requires additional equipment such as an external antenna or receiver that
must be provided by the subscriber, or whether Dish provides all the necessary equipment.
Either way, however, it may be sufficiently analogous to a CATV provider to be taken to
have itself engaged in the performances.
b. Are Those Performances “to the Public”?
If those performances are made by Dish, would they be “to the public”? Dish may argue that
it is distinguishable from Aereo in that it has paid the compulsory satellite retransmission
license fee to make the programming available to its users in the first place.183 However, it is
irrelevant that Dish may have a license for a different service. The correct analysis is to ask
whether Dish needs a license for the additional service, which it would if the relevant
performances fall within the scope of the copyright owners’ exclusive rights. If not, there is
no need to obtain a license. If so, then it becomes necessary to ask whether there is a license
that extends to that conduct. In the case of Dish, its license to provide the content to the users
in the first place does not extend to these online retransmissions and thus would not avail it
here.184
As was the case in Aereo, Dish’s subscribers would seem to have no prior relationship to the
works. No copies are made when the Hopper “slings” content to users, and the slinging
occurs nearly simultaneously with the transmission of live TV. 185 Any argument that
subscribers have a prior relationship by virtue of their entitlement to access those signals
181
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from their home TVs would seem doomed to failure: because the “slung” transmissions are
of live TV, the “prior” element must by definition be missing. Additionally, if it is Dish that
is engaging in the transmission, fair use is unlikely to assist it any more than it did Aereo.
For these reasons, if a court found that Dish was the performer, the court would likely also
find public performance liability.
The analysis of whether the performance was “public” looks quite different if we assume that
it is Dish’s subscriber who performs; Dish’s liability, if any, would be derivative of its
subscriber’s, and she would be unlikely to be performing “to the public.”186 Although the
individual subscriber who streams to herself may well be paying primarily to watch broadcast
TV, and lack any prior relationship to the works, she is not making the transmission available
to a “large” or “substantial” number of people, merely to herself. Furthermore, if it was the
user engaging in the transmission, she would have a much stronger fair use case for accessing
those signals via remote devices.187 Liability would be unlikely.
c. Who Engages in the Performances of the TV Timeshifted via a Hopper with Sling, and Are
They “to the Public”?
In the case of transmissions of prerecorded, timeshifted TV, the analysis is similar to that for
the timeshifting services provided by Aereo and Cablevision. The one key difference is that
the equipment is located at the subscriber’s home rather than remotely. Under the Aereo
majority’s reasoning, this factor would strengthen the argument that the transmissions are
made by the subscriber rather than the provider. 188 The analysis about whether those
transmissions would be “to the public” would be the same as set out above.
d. Is “Slinging” Unlawful After Aereo?
Slinging technologies were not at issue in Aereo, and indeed the district court judge there
noted that the plaintiffs “d[id] not appear to contend . . . that services such as Slingbox are
unlawful, instead claiming that they are ‘irrelevant’ and that Aereo’s service is
distinguishable because Slingbox consumers themselves set up the Slingbox in their
homes.”189 However, the Supreme Court’s reasoning may in fact be sufficiently broad to
capture these uses—at least where their provider is sufficiently analogous to the CATV
providers the Act was intended to cover. Recall that the cable television services Congress
brought within the 1976 Act included retransmissions not only of local signals (Aereo’s
business model), but also of distant signals (akin to Dish).190 Just like Aereo, Dish is selling a
service for the near-live broadcast of TV, and it is using its own equipment to do so. The
only real difference between the two is that equipment is not housed centrally. If this is
sufficient to result in a finding that Dish performs, those performances would clearly be “to
the public.” Under the Court’s ruling, however, a different result would likely follow from
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other versions of slinging technology. For example, it is possible for a user to purchase for a
one time outright fee a standalone Slingbox that plugs into her existing cable box or DVR.191
In that case, the technology provider’s role is relatively attenuated: the user would be the one
engaging in the transmissions, and, for reasons already canvassed, would not be doing so “to
the public.”192
3. Portable Antennae, or “Tablet TV”
Yet another variation on the theme is a new technology called “Tablet TV,” which is shortly
due to launch out of San Francisco.193 Subscribers will purchase a device called a “T-Pod”—
a digital TV antenna, tuner and DVR about the size of a palm—for around $50 to $100.194
Users have to be within 100 feet of the T-Pod to stream content, but otherwise the product
effectively enables subscribers to replicate Aereo’s near-live functionality with their own
equipment. 195 This time, the product is actually being driven by a broadcaster, Granite
Broadcasting, which claims to reach some six percent of U.S. television households.196
The product was announced well before the Supreme Court decided Aereo. In the post-Aereo
world, however, its legality remains assured. Since the Tablet TV will be both owned by its
users and physically located in their premises, its developers have a strong case that they are
mere equipment providers, and that it is the users who engage in any relevant act. Those
users’ access to free-to-air TV via their own antennae trigger no exclusive rights under
copyright; their at home transmissions are not “to the public.” Thus, there would be no
infringement.
IV. Report Card: Evaluating the Decision
The interpretations of both sides of the Aereo controversy could have made technological
design determine the existence of public performance liability. Aereo’s interpretation of the
law would have precluded a finding of public performance in many cases where the service
structured the transmission so it could be received by only a single individual. 197 The
broadcasters’ interpretation could have resulted in deeming a public performance to have
occurred whenever a service happened to make transmissions of the same works to multiple
members of the public.198 Neither interpretation focused sufficiently on the economic (as
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opposed to technological) nature or consequences of the use, and neither recognized the
potential relevance of the relationship between the recipient and the work. In finding that
Aereo’s interpretation prevailed, even the Second Circuit itself lamented the way in which its
reasoning led to technological design determining liability; it admitted: “Perhaps the
application of the Transmit Clause should focus less on the technical details of a particular
system and more on its functionality, but this Court’s decisions . . . held that technical
architecture matters.”199
Though the authors of this paper approach copyright law and policy from very different
perspectives, we unite in the view that it is undesirable for legal outcomes to depend so
heavily on technical design. Such laws are vulnerable to “avoision”—conduct, combining
aspects of law “evasion” and “avoidance,” that exploits “the differences between a law’s
goals and its self-defined limits.”200 In our previous work we urged the Supreme Court to
develop what it means for a performance to be “to the public” in order to enable principled
readings of the transmit clause which focused on the particular use rather than on the
technical architecture of the delivery service.201 In this section, we debate the extent to which
the Court succeeded in doing so and the benefits and demerits of its approach.
The majority’s reasoning succeeds in preventing businesses from “Aereoizing” their way out
of liability by simply designing services to make separate transmissions from unique copies
to individual users.202 It also ensures that future technology providers will not face public
performance liability simply because their services happen to make transmissions of the same
works to multiple members of the public. 203 However, the majority missed its mark in
developing a principled reading of the transmit clause. Under its reasoning, design
characteristics still matter too much—both to determining whether transmissions are “to the
public,” and in establishing who performs in the first place.
A. Vulnerabilities in the Court’s Decision
In determining whether transmissions are “to the public,” the majority repeatedly stressed the
size of the potential audience, holding that, if it is not “large” or “substantial,” the
performance cannot be “public.”204 Under this reasoning, services structured to offer content
to small audiences could fall outside the scope of the Act—even, perhaps, if the small
audiences cumulatively became large. As we noted above, the Copyright Act in fact refers to
the size of the audience only in the context of determining whether a performance is
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occurring in public, rather than whether it is transmitted to the public.205 It is likely that the
majority imported that size requirement into the latter analysis to avoid problems of
overinclusivity arising from its ruling that the relevant act was the performance of the
underlying work (rather than the individual transmission). Limiting the scope of the clause to
situations where the performance is directed to a “large” number of people ensures that
reading will not scoop up too many performances that might better be seen as “private.”206
Problematically however, the Court’s emphasis on the size of the potential audience risks
automatically putting a swathe of transmissions outside the scope of copyright owners’
exclusive rights without any consideration of whether those uses interfere with the market for
their works or otherwise cause harm.
Importing a size requirement into the transmit clause misses the essence of the statutory
distinction between public performances (encompassed within the copyright owner’s
exclusive rights) and non-public performances (to which exclusive rights do not extend):207
size is a proxy for economic significance; in most cases (at least under prior technologies) a
transmission offered to a small group of persons, or to members of a family and its social
acquaintance, would not have significantly intruded on the copyright owner’s markets for
publicly communicating performances of the work. But size is not a value of its own, and the
omission of a size-of-audience criterion from the text of the transmit clause (unlike the
performance “in public” clause) should be taken seriously. What matters is whether the
offeree of the transmission is a “member of the public,” not how many members of the public
are “capable of receiving” the transmission. The omission of a size threshold from the transit
clause enables the public performance right to adapt to changing market conditions as the
means and granularity of transmissions evolve.
B. Consequences of the Majority’s Interpretation of “to the Public”

The legislative history indicated that the reason for the “substantial number of persons” component
of the “in public” definition was to capture “semipublic places”:
Under clause (1) of the definition of ‘publicly’ in section 101, a performance or display is
“public” if it takes place “at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is
gathered” One of the principal purposes of the definition was to make clear that, contrary to
the decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Wyatt, 21 C.O. Bull. 203 (D. Md.
1932), performances in “semipublic” places such as clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps,
and schools are “public performances” subject to copyright control.
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The majority’s definition of “to the public” effectively obliged the Court to rule that the
“performer” of the act of communication was the service rather than the subscriber. Imagine
an Aereo-style service that offered near-live transmissions from individual antennae, on
demand from specific users, without making any copies. Suppose further that the person
deemed to be making the performance was the subscriber rather than the service. If the
subscriber was deemed the one who engaged in performances from the remote antenna to her
own computer, she would not be doing so “to the public” under the majority’s reasoning
because she would not be offering it to a “large” group of people. There would have been no
need even to consider whether the use was fair, because there would have been no prima
facie infringement in the first place. Such a finding would have opened the floodgates to
services offering near-live TV with no obligation to remunerate right holders for that content,
including the cable and satellite companies that currently pay billions of dollars a year in
retransmission fees.208
This hypothetical shows that, to avoid cleaving that enormous new loophole into the law, the
Court had to find that Aereo was the performer. And to do that, it needed to base its analysis
on something other than “volition,” the criterion on which the dissent relied to contend that
Aereo had not “performed,”209 and on which Cablevision’s analysis of who “made” the copy
rested.210 In plain English, volition refers to “the making of a definite choice or decision with
regard to a course of action; exercise of the will.”211 Showing the defendant’s “volition” had
not, in fact, historically been an element of a copyright infringement claim. Instead, it had
long been established that copyright infringement required no demonstration of defendant’s
intent to infringe.212
“Volition” as a criterion for determining who commits the copyright-triggering act can be
traced to the 1995 decision by the District Court for the Northern District of California in
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom. 213 There, the court declined to hold an ISP or
bulletin board provider directly liable for its facilities’ automatic reproduction of a
copyrighted work that one of its users had posted.214 (The service had not originated the
communication of the content at issue. 215 ) The court reasoned that, despite copyright
infringement’s strict liability standard, “there should still be some element of volition or
causation that is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a
208
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third party.”216 The Fourth Circuit subsequently endorsed that distinction in a case involving
an ISP whose subscribers uploaded infringing photographs to its servers.217
The Second Circuit in Cablevision significantly extended the ambit of the volition criterion
from passive communication of third party content to proposing content to copy at the user’s
behest. That court held that, “In determining who actually ‘makes’ a copy, a significant
difference exists between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally
operates the copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system,
which automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct.” 218 Though
noting that Cablevision’s discretion over the programming that it was making available for
recording made its conduct “more proximate” to the creation of the copies than merely
“operating an ISP,” the Second Circuit concluded that Cablevision’s involvement did not
suffice to justify a finding that Cablevision was itself a “make[r]” of the copies. 219 Unlike its
predecessors in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the Second Circuit found an absence of
volition even where the service was the source of the content communicated to the users.
Whether or to what extent “volition” is in fact a predicate to a finding of infringement
therefore invites debate. In any event, the Aereo majority held that Aereo was the one that
engaged in the performances without any reference to volition at all. The majority carefully
cabined its reasoning to cable TV-like technologies, and emphasized that it did “not
determine whether different kinds of providers in different contexts also ‘perform’”; thus, it
did not explicitly reject a volition standard, either.220 Nonetheless, it is worth addressing the
troubling consequences that could arise if some concept of willing participation in the
communication were to be completely rejected in determining who does the legally relevant
act.
As the dissent pointed out, volition is a vital tool for preserving the distinction between
primary and secondary infringement. 221 If a user puts a technology to infringing use, the
provider’s secondary liability will depend on both the existence of primary infringement and
the extent of its contribution to or involvement in that infringement. The distinction between
direct and secondary liability has long provided welcome breathing room for new
technologies and uses. If the subscriber’s deliberate act is attributed to the passive
technology provider instead, that distinction evaporates. The question of “who does the act”
is also vital to considerations of fair use. As described above, U.S. fair use law has
historically applied very differently to services that engage in uses on their customers’ behalf
than to customers who do those same acts themselves.222 Thus, if the technology provider is
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found to be the one engaging in the relevant act, the likelihood that its conduct will be ruled
“fair” diminishes.223
In bypassing any mention of volition in its finding that Aereo was the performer of the
relevant acts (and thus itself directly liable for infringement), the majority may have
implicitly recognized that secondary infringement mechanisms would not in that instance
sufficiently safeguard right holder interests. As we explained above, the majority’s
interpretation of “to the public” effectively obliged it to find that Aereo was the one that
“performed” the transmissions. Since the subscriber in the Aereo one-transmission-onerecipient scenario was never transmitting to a “large” number of people, a ruling that the
subscriber was the “performer” would have precluded any finding of prima facie primary
infringement. As a result, all manner of personalized retransmissions would have fallen
outside the scope of the Act, and without any direct infringement there can be no basis for
holding the service provider secondarily liable.
That said, the absence on Aereo’s facts of a viable secondary infringement claim does not in
general invalidate or render irrelevant the traditional distinction between primary and
secondary infringement. Instead, it highlights the need for sensible and principled rules
governing primary infringement. The Supreme Court failed to provide such rules in Aereo.
While its solution removed Aereo from the near-live television retransmission market, its
underinclusive definition of the words “to the public” (and particularly its focus on the need
for the potential audience to comprise a “large” number of people) may blur the distinction
between primary and secondary infringement, at least in scenarios resembling Aereo’s.224
Since there can be no direct liability in situations where the performance is directed to only a
small number of people, the only way to grant relief may be, as occurred on Aereo’s facts, to
find that the service provider itself engaged in the act. The Court’s focus on the service’s acts
also enabled it to forego inquiry into whether or not the subscriber’s use was “fair.”
Our application of Aereo’s principles to other technologies demonstrated that a great deal
hangs on “who does the act.” 225 We are not convinced that this outcome is desirable or
appropriate. We live in a world where technologies provide us with ever-more sophisticated
assistance in our day-to-day lives. Backup software automatically scans our hard drives for
new content, and uploads copies to the cloud for safekeeping. 226 TiVos helpfully record
shows for us based on programs we have previously enjoyed. 227 As technology advances,
courts’ determination of who actually engages in the act of public performance (or of
223
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reproduction) will require the making of increasingly fine-grained and potentially unhelpful
distinctions that result in analyses that address only part of the story. If a court finds that the
user does the act, her right to do the act is taken into account, but if her act is deemed
noninfringing, then no consideration is given to whether the service provider’s contribution to
the commission of the act should be permitted for free.228 If the service provider is the “doer,”
then courts assess the legality of its participation, but give less consideration to whether the
ultimate use ought to be allowed.229 (Just because the user may have been entitled to do the
act for herself, does not mean that a for-profit service should be entitled to do the act on her
behalf.230)
Given the increasing potential for arbitrary outcomes from the “who does?” analysis, it seems
to us that “who does?” is the wrong question. A better approach would consider whether,
after full reflection on the contributions of each party, the use should be permitted for free.
This inquiry usually occurs at the exceptions stage of the analysis, where courts apply fair use
principles with reference to the full range of circumstances, including the extent to which the
delivery method interferes with paid markets for protected works. 231 While the authors of
this paper sometimes disagree about where the fair use line ought to be drawn in specific
cases, we do agree that it is undesirable for the infringement analysis to turn on potentially
arbitrary findings about who did the relevant act.
The arbitrariness of those distinctions can be demonstrated with reference to the factors the
majority indicated could make a technology provider the “performer” (at least in the absence
of volition). Key considerations derived from Aereo will include: Where the equipment is
located, who owns it, and how perfect a substitute it provides for live TV (or potentially other
licensed markets for works).232 In addition to the concerns we raise above, we are perturbed
by the possibility that future judicial determination of whether technology providers have
engaged in the legally relevant acts will depend too heavily on the relationship of the design
of their technologies to their business models. Our application of Aereo’s principles to other
technologies shows that these factors may make the difference between legality and
infringement—even when the ultimate act remains the same. Because so much currently
hinges on “who does the act?,” the Court’s decision has the capacity to influence significantly
the evolution of future dissemination technologies. Online access to remote equipment is
cheap and efficient, and can result in improved access for individuals who cannot afford to
purchase it outright. Post-Aereo however, providers have powerful new incentives to design
products that are owned by consumers and based in their homes—even though considerations
of location and ownership say nothing about the desirability or harm of the underlying use.
The Second Circuit had expressed regret that the statute (in its view) placed such importance
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on technical architecture. 233 Under the majority’s interpretations, technical architecture
matters less—but it still matters far too much.
Perhaps most problematically, the majority’s reasoning is vulnerable to precisely the same
kind of technological exploitation that it was designed to redress. Imagine, for example, what
would happen if, rather than streaming content to users, Aereo instead redesigned its service
to deliver downloads to subscribers’ cloud storage lockers. In our analysis above we
demonstrated that, if Aereo redesigned its service to offer only its timeshifting product, its
potential liability for infringing public performances would apparently depend on whether its
service was still sufficiently cable-like in the case of those time delayed transmissions to treat
Aereo as the “performer” of the transmissions.234 The longer the time delay, the less cablelike the service, hence the prospects for technological redesign to eliminate the chance of
public performance liability while facilitating precisely the same end result.235 The majority
confirmed that there can be no performance in the absence of the communication of
“contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds.” 236 If Aereo delivered downloads
instead of streams, there would be no contemporaneous perceptibility and therefore no
performance for which it could be liable.237 And subsequent playback by the user to herself
would not be an infringing public performance either, under the majority’s reasoning,
because she is not offering it to a “large” group of people.238 Thus, future providers could
avoid both direct liability for public performance (and potential secondary liability for their
users’ transmissions) by making a minor change to their technical design that interferes little
with the function of its timeshifting service. (Whether Aereo’s delivery of the downloads
would result in liability for infringement of the reproduction and distribution rights would
turn on the characterization of “who copies?,” an issue central to Cablevision, 239 but
untouched by the Supreme Court’s decision in Aereo. Were the service deemed the “maker”
of the copies, it likely would be held liable. Were the user the “copier,” the service could
potentially bear secondary liability depending on the outcome of the fair use analysis.)
In other cases, however, the public performance right is the only one of possible relevance.
For example, in the wake of the Aereo decision, a Wall Street Journal article proposed a
novel way of reducing cable bills: sharing a single cable subscription between two
233
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households by utilizing a Slingbox.240 One household would have legitimate access to the
cable content via a paid subscription, and sling the content to the other, giving access to the
content without ever making any copies.241 The writer argued this arrangement was legal
because “this stream goes from one cable connection to just one outside device.”242
But transmissions even to a small audience can interfere significantly with licensed markets.
Think about how the arrangement proposed by the Wall Street Journal might spread. The
“sharing economy” is all the rage, connecting those who have unused resources with those
who seek them. AirBnB, for example, creates a market for households to rent out their spare
rooms.243 Uber joins those who need a ride with those who have a car.244 Households with
cable subscriptions might readily reach agreement with friends or relatives to share those, too.
And the cable-equipped households could add more functionality by attaching the Slingbox
to a secondary set-top box, allowing both households to have full access to the subscribing
household’s content without limiting anyone’s viewing choices.245 Since they are
nonrivalrous in consumption, TV signals could be the ultimate contribution to the “sharing
economy.”246
We caution, however, that Aereo should not spawn “sharing economy” brokerage services,
akin to Air BnB or Uber. A household that offers unused cable service to a friend limits not
only the transmission but also the offer to one other person. By contrast, an “Uber for cable
TV” service offers the surplus cable service to the public in general, even though only one
household will in fact receive the shared cable transmissions. Properly understood, Aereo’s
definition of “the public” refers to the public to whom the transmission is proposed. If the
brokerage service is putting the sharing household together with the first-comer who replies
to an offer made to members of the public at large (or, for that matter, to members of a more
narrowly defined “public,” such as fans of Homeland), the transmissions are “to the
public.”247
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Of course, the Aereo Court did not confront such scenarios, but the proposed arrangement
indeed appears to be consistent with the Court’s statements, to the extent they explicitly
exclude transmissions that the person engaging in the performance directs to only a small
group or to a single individual.248 Applying Aereo, the performances would be engaged in by
the householder providing and hosting the equipment and signal. But the performances
would not be “to the public” under the majority’s reasoning, because they would not have
been offered to a “large or substantial” number of people, even though the cumulative impact
on rightholders were many people to adopt this practice could be severe.
Aereo’s concept of “the public,” at least as currently articulated, seems insufficiently nuanced
to deal with situations involving individual performances to small audiences that
cumulatively interfere with markets for licensed alternatives. Moreover, once an avenue of
exploitation opens, many will surely follow it; the more widespread the activity, the more
difficult it may later become to interpret the copyright act to restrict the practice. Given the
potential significance of the public performance right, it is disappointing that the Court’s
reasoning may open the door to some of the same kind of “avoision” or technological
exploitation that it was intended to address.
V. Giblin’s Conclusions
The above analysis highlights some significant problems that will arise in applying the
Supreme Court’s ruling in future cases, despite the majority’s careful attempt to cabin its
holdings. Its interpretation of the words “to the public” will sometimes be underinclusive (by
excluding certain transmissions from the scope of the public performance right whenever the
potential audience is not “large”) and sometimes overinclusive (by sweeping up all
transmissions where technological design and business model suggest the service provider
engages in them, regardless of the desirability of the ultimate use). It perpetuates the game of
technological cat-and-mouse because the rules will apply differently depending on who owns
the equipment, where it is based, whether performances are streamed or downloaded and
played back later, and the size of the audience. That makes it vulnerable to precisely the
same kind of “avoision” that it was intended to address in the first place. The Court’s
reasoning also weakens the distinction between primary and secondary infringement in a way
that will sometimes have the effect of making some vital fair use considerations disappear
from the analysis altogether.
A. Aereo’s problems could have been avoided
Every one of these problems could have been avoided had the Court more fully developed
what it means for a performance to be “to the public.” As previously noted, the majority
recognized the relationship between the work and the recipient as relevant in determining
whether a performance is public within the meaning of the Act. 249 Thus, if the recipient has a
license or fair use privilege to use the work, that may affect whether the use falls within the
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scope of the performance right at all. Developed a little further, that relationship could
provide a mechanism for distinguishing between public and private performances without
reference to either the design of the technology or the size of the audience. Australia’s law
illustrates how that analysis could work. In determining whether a communication is “to the
public,” Australian courts ask whether the recipient of the performance is a member of the
“copyright owner’s public.”
This approach originates in a line of U.K. cases that focused on the harm the act causes to the
author of the work in determining whether a performance was “in public.”250 Proceeding on
the basis that such harm is the crucial consideration, Australian law recognizes “the relevant
‘public’ [a]s the group which the copyright owner would otherwise contemplate as its public
for the performance of its work.”251 Thus, the essence of a performance “to the public” in
Australian law is that it is occurring in circumstances where the owner is entitled to expect
payment for the work’s authorized performance.252 This interpretation recognizes that it is
sometimes possible for a user to engage in a public performance even where she transmits a
work to herself.253 The size of the audience does not matter, only the relationship between
the recipient and the copyright owner or the work.
By focusing squarely on whether the use is something for which the copyright owner could
reasonably expect a royalty, this interpretation provides a principled way of distinguishing
between uses that should and should not be permitted. Such distinctions can be made even
where the technology, service provider and audience are the same, independent of arbitrary
considerations such as the size of the audience, how the system works, where the equipment
is located and who owns the equipment.254 Thus, it is able to distinguish between a person
slinging her cable signal to a tablet computer to watch it in bed instead of on the couch on the
one hand (something that seems likely to be a fair use), and two households using the same
technology to avoid having to pay for two separate subscriptions on the other (which, given
the purpose and character of the use, and its potential effect on the market, does not). The
former is not a situation where it would be reasonable for the copyright owner to expect a
royalty; but the latter certainly would be.
The question of “who performs” becomes much less significant in my proposed analysis,
because the focus would be on the relationship between the recipient and the work. That
relationship remains the same regardless of who actually transmits the content. Since, under
Telstra Corp. v Australasian Performing Right Ass’n (1997) 191 CLR 140, 198–200 (Austl.) (citing
Ernest Turner Elec. Instruments Ltd. v Performing Right Soc’y Ltd., [1943] Ch. 167 at 171–73 (Eng.);
Jennings v Stephens, [1936] Ch. 469 at 485 (Eng.); Harms (Inc.) Ltd. v Martans Club Ltd., [1927] 1
Ch. 526 at 532 (Eng.)).
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(“If the maker of the communication was the user, as I have found, he or she necessarily made it to
himself or herself. However, that is not determinative of whether the user so communicated the work
‘to the public’ . . . .”).
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my approach, primary infringement can accrue equally regardless of who does the act, this
conception reduces the potential for very different outcomes, which depend on arbitrary
factors such as who owns the equipment and where it is based. Having said that, I would not
deprive the question of “who performs” of all significance: under the existing law, it is still
determinative of who bears that direct liability.
As previously identified, under Aereo, a finding that the equipment provider “performs”
would have two main effects. First, fair use would apply differently than if the user was
identified as the doer. 255 By contrast, my approach would significantly ameliorate that
consequence, since I would give consideration to whether the recipient had a fair use
privilege in determining whether the communication was “to the public” regardless of who
performs it.
The second consequence of the Aereo analysis is that the traditional distinction between
primary and secondary infringement would disappear. I see this as troubling, at least in cases
where the service provider has not in some way exercised its will to bring about the act. That
outcome could be avoided by applying some form of “volition” standard. Where the user is
identified as being the one who does the legally relevant act, the service provider’s liability
could then be determined applying existing secondary liability principles assessing the extent
of its encouragement, contribution, or involvement.
Applying such a reading of the transmit clause would avoid all of the problems identified
above—and not necessarily mean a free pass for Aereo. Assume that an individual Aereo
subscriber transmitted works to herself, near-live to the broadcast time, and was deemed to be
the performer of those transmissions. Whether or not those performances were “public”
would come down to whether, in all the circumstances, the copyright owner could reasonably
expect a royalty for that use. If the use amounted to an unremunerable fair use, there could
be no such expectation, and the transmission would not be “to the public.” If no exception
applied, however, that online streaming of a protected work (particularly in circumstances
where the copyright holder offers that service in exchange for royalties) would be precisely
the kind of situation where a royalty could be expected. In that case, the recipient would be
one of the copyright owner’s public and would thus have engaged in a public performance.
The standard would adjust with usage: as technologies and uses evolve, so too would the
circumstances in which it would be reasonable for the copyright owner to expect a royalty.
In determining whether the copyright owner could reasonably expect a royalty for the use,
full consideration should be given to all relevant circumstances, including the extent to which
the method of delivery is interfering with the market for licensed use. Crucially, this part of
the analysis should not change regardless of who is identified as the performer, because the
focus is on the relationship between the recipient and the work, regardless of who transmits it.
The analytical steps to be followed are exactly the same regardless of whether the
transmission is directly from Aereo’s storage or from the user’s own cloud locker; near-live
or time delayed. Whether or not any of those usages would be “fair” has not yet been
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developed in the legal record, but it is by no means clear that the transmissions would be
accepted as “fair.” Sony was far from a blanket authorization of any and all consumer
copying of television broadcasts, and Aereo is readily distinguishable on a number of bases
including the financial impact its use has on right holders, its addition of placeshifting
functionality that competes with licensed markets, and the general lack of “friction” in the
copying process. If Aereo’s users had no fair use right or license to engage in the
performances, they would be public. Aereo’s involvement in setting up the transmission
system and encouraging its use would then result in liability for inducing those infringements,
and may also give rise to vicarious liability.256 Relying on secondary infringement to obtain
redress in cases involving suppliers of goods or services can be problematic where the law
that governs primary infringement is unsatisfactory. For example, a conception of “the
public” that relies on transmissions being directed to a “large” number of people will fail to
fully capture all of the circumstances in which a transmission might be public in nature, and
there secondary liability cannot be counted on to reliably provide redress. However, where
there are principled and effective rules in place regarding primary infringement, as the one
proposed here, secondary liability can be trusted to provide appropriate safeguards.
As my coauthor has previously noted, this analysis can be criticized for circularity. 257 In the
event that there is a public performance that amounts to the doing of one of the copyright
owner’s exclusive rights, which ordinarily gives rise to an entitlement to payment. If the way
in which we determine whether such a performance has occurred is with reference to whether
the right holder is entitled to payment, taking account not only the acts that trigger a finding
Vicarious infringement accrues where a defendant “has the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.” Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). There is some uncertainty as to
the extent to which a defendant must have the ability to supervise infringement for the first element to
be satisfied. See, e.g., Rebecca Giblin, ‘A Bit Liable? A Guide To Navigating The U.S. Secondary
Liability Patchwork,’ 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 7, 39 (2008). Aereo clearly
satisfies even the stricter approach because it has a genuine practical ability to control the direct
infringer’s infringement by simply eliminating the option to watch broadcasts while they’re still airing.
2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 92, § 8.2.2. Discovery would be needed to determine the
extent to which the near-live uses impacted Aereo’s revenue, but it is highly likely that it would have
a sufficiently direct financial interest in their users’ infringement for the second element to also be
satisfied. Liability for inducement arises where a defendant “distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken
to foster infringement.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37
(2005). The doctrine’s application to copyright law was recognized for the first time by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Grokster. Id. There, the Court found three “particularly notable” indicia of intent
to be “unmistakable” evidence of the defendants’ “unlawful objective”: (1) the fact that each
“showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement”; (2)
their failure to develop any mechanisms to reduce their products’ use for infringement and (3) the fact
that their business models were predicated on infringement. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 939–40. If
Aereo’s users’ near-live transmissions were infringing, Aereo would be clearly liable for inducement
under this standard. It has designed its system to facilitate near-live streaming, it has actively
encouraged the practice and it has advertised it as a feature. Discovery would be needed to determine
the extent to which its business model was dependent on that practice, but per the vicarious
infringement analysis above, it would likely have a significant financial interest in that infringement.
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of infringement, but also those that excuse it, the analysis may start to look like a snake that is
eating its tail. However, the Supreme Court has already indicated comfort with similar
circularity via its holding that whether or not recipients constitute “the public” often depends
on their relationship to the underlying work.258 Furthermore, by refocusing the analysis on
the relationship between the copyright owner and the recipient in determining whether the
performance is “public” in the first place, that redundancy performs the useful function of
ensuring the law gives adequate consideration to whether the use itself ought to be permitted.
B. A Missed Opportunity
The Aereo Court welcomely went some way towards recognizing the importance of the
relationship between the copyright owner or work and recipient of the transmission to the
determination of whether a particular performance is public. By developing that concept a
little further, the definition of “to the public” could provide a principled mechanism for
distinguishing between private and public transmissions with reference to the use itself, rather
than business model or technical design. In its current form, however, the law remains
exploitable and unsatisfactory.
Future courts may be tempted to fill in the holes in the majority’s reasoning with ever broader
answers to the question of “who performs.” Where an individual is offering a transmission
exclusively to herself, but the court nonetheless considers it to be the kind of use Congress
intended to capture, the only way of bringing it within the Act would be to further relax the
volition predicate outside the cable TV analogy. That standard has been vehemently
criticized by my coauthor, who presciently argued in 2008 that it “could herald the
development of business models designed to elude copyright control over the exploitation of
works, particularly in a technological environment in which pervasive automation is
increasingly foreseeable.”259 This is, of course, precisely what Aereo sought to do. I agree it
is undesirable for laws to be circumventable via clever architectural design (rather than by
reference to the use).
Nonetheless, any impulse to disregard “volition” in determining who commits the copyrighttriggering act should be resisted. Where users remain intimately involved in the copyrightinvoking act, the legality of those ultimate end uses needs to remain a relevant consideration,
just as the involvement of the service provider should be as well. Imposing direct liability on
operators of automated, user-directed systems with no reference to whether those ultimate
uses should be permitted is at least as dangerous. As more of our lives are being lived
digitally and online, copying and transmission rights are invoked more often, and questions
about whether we should be permitted to freely engage in those uses grow commensurately
more important. Copyright owners’ exclusive rights ought to be read in a way that leaves
room for those considerations.
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As this analysis has demonstrated, this goal is achievable within the existing statutory
framework. By building on the Court’s recognition of the importance of the relationship
between the user and the work, and further developing what it means for a transmission to be
“to the public,” it is possible to have a principled reading of the transmit clause that focuses
on the use instead of business model or technical design. Vitally, in a world where it is so
cheap and easy for content to be streamed online, that reading explains why even
transmissions offered to a small number of people might be “public.” It also treats
technologies alike, whether local or remote, owned or rented, and so avoids biasing the
direction of their development. And, perhaps most importantly, it incentivizes technology
providers to confine their efforts to developing services that assist users to exercise their
lawful rights instead of continuing to encourage those entrepreneurs to code their way outside
the scope of the law. Admittedly, some will always seek to push the boundaries of
copyright’s exclusive rights and exceptions, and entrepreneurs and right holders may have
different views about where the frontier between infringement and lawful use lies. We can,
however, design laws to minimize the opportunities for technological exploitation, and give
courts appropriate, principled mechanisms for responding to those who step out of bounds.
VI. Ginsburg’s Conclusions
We have identified two problems the Aereo decision presents to assessing the copyrightcompatibility of other, future, technologies that communicate performances or copies of
works of authorship. First, the paramount importance of “who performs” (and implicitly,
“who copies”). Second, the determination of “the public” to which the work is offered.
A. Who Performs?
We have suggested that making this question the determinative threshold for liability is
problematic because the factors that, in the Aereo analysis, make an enterprise the “performer”
are too susceptible to manipulation, and therefore risk elevating technological form over
economic substance. The characterization of “who performs” should instead “follow the
money.” A concept of active participation in the communication may prove more pertinent,
and less technology-dependent, than the “volition” predicate as employed by the Second
Circuit in Cablevision. 260 The latter, as we have seen, lends itself to evasion through
automation. The “plain English” definition of “volition” may be closer to the mark: “the
making of a definite choice or decision with regard to a course of action; exercise of the
will.”261 It would cover services structured to transmit performances of content offered to the
public; that is the “course of action.” If the service is proposing the content (including
content originally proposed by the primary transmission service whose content the defendant
service is retransmitting), then the (re)transmitter knows what it is offering, even though it
may not know which particular works the user will select from among the offerings. To the
extent these services are instead merely transmitting or allowing users to access third party
content that the services are not proposing, they might be deemed mere equipment
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providers.262 Moreover, the safe harbor provisions of § 512(a) and (c) of the Copyright Act
absolve of all liability, direct or derivative, both mere conduit service providers and host
service providers that remove infringing user-posted content upon receipt of a proper
notice.263 But to require that each transmission manifest specific intent to deliver particular
content simply invites technological work-arounds to limit human intervention to the fullest
extent possible.
B. “To the Public”
1. What Does “to the Public” Mean?
We have queried the coherence of the limiting role of the user’s relationship to the work.
How, on the one hand, can there be a public performance if transmissions of performances of
the same work are offered to a large number of persons, regardless of the number of source
copies for the transmission, but, on the other hand, no public performance when the recipient
has some kind of possessory relationship to the work? 264 The service’s proposal of the
content to members of the public (in their capacity as members of the public) contributes to
the determination that its communication is “to the public.” By contrast, where the audience
for the transmission from the subscriber’s “own” copy is the subscriber herself, Aereo
indicates that the transmission is not “to the public” (assuming that copy is not made for the
purpose of structuring transmissions to the public, as was the case in Aereo).265
But if the “possessory relationship” renders the communication non-public in nature, I would
go further: it should not matter if the service makes the transmission from the recipient’s
individual “own” copy, or instead from a centralized copy, so long as the recipient was
already entitled to receive the performance. To require individualized source copies in this
context makes the determination as technology-dependent as in the Second Circuit’s Aereo
and Cablevision decisions. On my view, services like Dropbox should be able to centralize
repeat-player third-party content that its users store, and not have to waste resources
duplicating storage space. The economic impact on the copyright owner is the same whether
the source copy for the transmission is individualized or centralized. Arguably, once
Dropbox centralizes the content, it becomes more implicated in the communication of the
content, but Dropbox still will not have initiated the offer of those works (and therefore under
Aereo might not even be the entity that “performs” them).
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Whether the transmission is “to the public” should be assessed by reference to what kind of
service the public is paying for: streaming of copyrighted content on demand on the one
hand,266 or access to “my stuff” on the other,267 when “my stuff” includes “my” previouslyacquired lawfully-made copy or unrestricted right of access to the works. I stress the lawful
nature of the relationship between the user and the work because the possessory relationship
that, according to Aereo, justifies labeling the performance as not “to the public” necessarily
implies that the possession or access be lawful.268 If the content is illegally acquired, it is not
“mine.” What makes the possession “mine” may result from a license agreement or from a
fair or tolerated use, such as format-shifting a hardcopy CD to a digital file. This assessment
of the nature of the service is technology-neutral. What matters is what the service does, not
how it does it.269
2. Does Size of Audience Matter?
We also have expressed concern that the Aereo Court’s conflation of the two different kinds
of “public” in the § 101 definition of “to perform publicly” may result in excluding
transmissions whose potential audiences do not comprise “a substantial number of persons,”
even when those transmissions in the aggregate may cause a significant economic impact.270
For example, under Aereo, if the audience for the subscriber’s “own copy” consists of the
subscriber’s family members or limited circle of social acquaintance (i.e., not Facebook
“friends”), the transmission might not be “public.”271 Combined with the sort of slinging to
friends service posited above, 272 one can readily perceive the potential for deleterious
economic impact.
My coauthor’s notion of the “copyright owner’s public” could result in a determination that
in this scenario the works are nonetheless publicly performed. But it is not clear under what
circumstances, even on a capacious concept of “who performs,” the service (as opposed to
the subscriber) would be deemed to have engaged in the copyright-infringing act. Moreover,
§ 512(c) takedowns may not offer a solution where access to the content is confined to a
closed circle of family and social acquaintances, when the copyright owner is unable to
discover the locations of its works’ availability and the service does not cooperate of its own
accord in blocking access. 273 And if the service is transmitting, but not storing, user266
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communicated content, then § 512(a) confers on the service complete immunity from both
primary and secondary liability.274 Similarly, given the substantial non infringing uses that
multiple-user access to personal storage lockers enable in the abstract, the service’s
secondary liability is unlikely to be engaged unless the copyright owner can show that the
service promoted its capacity to substitute for paid online access to the stored content.
The cumulative consequences of end-user communications to a small audience thus may
yield “public performances” by the end users under a “copyright owner’s public” analysis,
but, as a practical matter, those infringements will go unremedied unless the service that
enables those communications will also, by cooperation or by judicial compulsion, prevent
them. Whether this is a good outcome depends on whether the law of secondary liability
sufficiently distinguishes mere technology providers from exploiters of copyrighted works.
The Aereo approach of broadly defining the “performer,” and varying the characterization of
whether the performance is “to the public” based on the recipient’s possessory relationship to
the content, may—despite the shortcomings we have identified—in many cases sufficiently
divine the line between equipment and exploitation. But if the Supreme Court persists,
notwithstanding the language of the definition of “to perform publicly,” in making the size of
the audience a criterion for assessing the “public” to which a transmission is offered, there
remains the risk that transmissions to audiences small in instance but large in aggregate may
fall outside the scope of the copyright law.
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